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ABSTRACT
The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ adjusted monetary base combines in a single index
Federal Reserve actions that affect the supply base money -- open market operations, discount
window lending and unsterilized foreign exchange market intervention -- with actions that affect
depository institutions’ demand forbase money -- changes in statutory reserve requirements. The
adjusted monetary base equals the sum of the monetary base and a reserve adjustment magnitude
(RAM) that maps changes in reserve requirements into equivalent changes in the (unadjusted)
monetary base. This paper presents a revised measureof the adjusted total reserves component
ofthe monetary base and a new RAM. The revised measure ofthe adjusted reserves component
differs from the current measure by including the aggregate amount of depository institutions’
required clearing balance contracts with the Federal Reserve. The new RAM differs from the
current RAM by recognizing that, sincetheMonetary ControlAct of 1980, an increasing number
ofdepository institutions have not significantly changed their demand for base money (vaultcash
and Federal Reserve deposits) relative to transactions deposits following changes in statutory
reserve requirements. The new adjustedreserves data suggest that the stance ofmonetary policy,
measured by the growth rate of adjusted reserves, has been more volatile since 1980 then
suggested by the current measure.
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The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ adjusted monetary base has been widely
monitored as an indicator of Federal Reserve quantitative monetary policy actions since its
introduction in 1968.1 The adjusted monetary base is a valuable indicator of the stance of
monetary policy because extended periods of rapid growth of the monetary base have often
preceded accelerations of inflation in the United States andother countries. Historical
evidence also shows that supportive growth of the monetary base is necessary forinflation to
continue for an extended period.2 In addition, the monetary base plays central roles in
models of monetary economies as a default risk-free asset used for portfolio adjustment,
including satisfying reserve requirements for depository institutions, and as the medium for
final settlement of debts arisingfrom the exchange of goods and services.3 In model and in
real economies, the ability of depository institutions to issue new liabilities and acquire
earning assets is limited both by reserve requirements and by the institutions’ need to maintain
* We are indebted to Daniel Steiner for excellent research assistance. We also thank the staff of
the Division of Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for
providing the panel dataset used in this article.
‘Andersen and Jordan (1968).
2 See for example Sargent (1982, 1986).
Seefor exampleTobin (1969), Bmnnerand Meltzer (1976), Wallace (1977), Bryant and Wallace
(1979) and Kareken and Wallace (1980).2
an adequate stock of base money to settle interbank payments.4
The adjusted monetary base combines in asingle index Federal Reserve actions that
affect the supply of base money -- open market operations, discount window lending and
unsterilized foreign exchange market intervention -- with actions that affect depository
institutions’ demand forbase money -- changes in statutory reserve requirements. To measure
the adjusted monetary base, we need amechanism fortranslating the effects of reserve
requirement changes into “equivalent” changes in the monetary base, measured in teims of
open market operations or other actions. The reserve adjustment magnitude, or RAM,
provides such a mechanism by measuring the amount ofbase money “absorbed” or “liberated”
by the change in requirements.5 The adjusted monetary base equals the sum of the monetary
base and RAM.6
We present in this article a revised measure of the monetary base and a new RAM.
The revised measure of the monetary base differs from the current measure by including the
aggregate amount of depository institutions’ required clearing balance contracts with the
Federal Reserve.7 The current measure excludes required clearing balance contracts from the
‘I The need for banks to settle interbank payments in base money (central bank deposits) is an
important part of the demand for the monetary base in countries without reserve requirements
against deposits. See Bank of Canada(1987, 1989, 1991). Note that in these countries all central
bank deposits held by depository institutions are (voluntary) clearing balances. In the United
States, the FederalReserve also supplies significant amounts ofintra-day FederalReserve deposits
used for payments activity. During 1994, these deposits averaged approximately $50 billion per
day, or nearly twice the close-of-business amount of Federal Reserve deposits included in the
monetary base. See Richards (1995), p. 1066.
~The teiminology of absorption and liberation ofreserves through changes in legal reserve ratios
can be found in official Federal Reserve publications at least as early as 1954. See Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1954), p. 51.
6 See Burger and Rasche (1977),
An additional difference is the inclusion of float-pricingrelated as-of adjustments.3
monetary base.8 The new RAM differs from the current RAM by recognizing that, since the
Monetary Control Actof 1980, an increasing number of depository institutions have not
significantly changed their demand forbase money (vault cash and Federal Reserve deposits)
relative to transactions deposits following changes in statutory reserve requirements. The
RAM currently included in the St. Louis adjusted monetary base is based on an assumption
that all depository institutions will promptly change their holdings of base money following a
change in required reserves dueto achange in reserve requirements. The new RAM seeks to
separate those depository institutions that have responded in this way from those institutions
that have not.
CURRENT AND REVISED MEASURES OF THE MONETARY BASE: DIFFERENCES
The current St. Louis monetary base equals the sum of reserve balances of depository
institutions at Federal Reserve Banks plus currency in circulation outside the Treasury and the
Federal Reserve. The revised measure of the monetary base equals the sum of the Federal
Reserve deposits of depository institutions plus currency in circulation.9 The currency
component of the monetary base is unchanged. The revised measure of the monetary base
differs from the current measure by including all deposits of domestic depository institutions at
Federal Reserve Banks, whether used to satisfy legal reserve requirements, to satisfy required
clearing balance contracts or for any other purpose. The principle difference between the
current andrevised measures of the monetary base is the inclusion of the aggregate amount of
The aggregate nominal amount of required clearing balance contracts is excluded, rather than
the amount of Federal Reserve deposits used to satisfy the contracts, because data on the latter
are not available.
By including all Federal Reserve deposits, the revised measure corresponds more closely than
the current measure to the concepts of the monetary base discussed by Bmnner (1961), Friedman
and Schwartz (1963), Cagan (1965), and Balbach and Burger (1976).4
depository institutions’ required clearing balance contracts.
Reserve Balances and Required Clearing Balance Contracts
“Reserve balances” is an accounting concept intended to measure the aggregate
amount of reserves available to support depository institutions’ deposits.1° Reserve balances
are measured by subtracting the aggregate amount of depository institutions’ required clearing
balance contracts from the aggregate amount of their Federal Reserve deposits.11
Required clearing balance contracts were introduced by the Federal Reserve in
Febmary 1981 after some depository institutions experienced problems with overdrafts on their
Federal Reserve deposit accounts.12 Prior to November 1980, the use of Federal Reserve
interbank payment services (including check clearing and wire transfer) was the almost
exclusive provinceof member banks.13 Because the reserve requirements imposed on member
banks were relatively high, the Federal Reserve deposits held by member banks were generally
sufficient to absorb the debits and credits resulting from interbank payments activity without
overdrafts on their Federal Reserve accounts.’4 The Monetary Control Act reduced reserve
10 Reserve balancesdata are published weekly on the Board of Governors’ statistical releases, and
monthly in the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
In addition to the amount ofrequired clearingbalance contracts, some other bookkeepingentries
are subtracted. The total of these items is referred to as “service-related balances and
adjustments” on the Board of Governor’s weekly H.4.l data release.
2 Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1981, pp. 247-49, and December 1982, p. 756.
~Nonmemberbanks heldclearingdeposits atFederalReserve Banks before theMonetary Control
Act, but the amounts are small. See Cagan (1965), p. 335, Friedman and Schwartz (1963), p. 748,
andBanking and Monetary Statistics 1941-1970, (1976), p. 518.
14 In 1977 required reserve ratios at member banks ranged from aminimum of seven percent on
the first two million of net demand deposits to 16.25 percent on net demand deposits in excess
of 400 million dollars. The required reserve ratio on savings deposits was threepercent and the
reserve requirements on time deposits maturing in less than 180 days were three percent on the
first five million dollars and six percent on time deposits in excess of five million dollars.
(Federal Reserve Bulletin, December, 1977, p. A9)5
requirements on member banks and also granted nonmember institutions the right to use
Federal Reserve payments services. Overdrafts on Federal Reserve accounts became a
problem for some institutions becausethe Act’s requirements were phased-in and many
nonmember institutions initially satisfied their reserve requirements with vault cash.
The Federal Reserve’s required clearing balance program began as a way to increase
the amount of Federal Reserve deposits maintained by depository institutions without
discouraging them from purchasing payment services from the Federal Reserve, rather than
from private correspondent banks. Through negotiation, depositories were encouraged to enter
into contracts requiring that they maintain additional deposits at the Federal Reserve, called
required clearing balances, above andbeyond the amount necessary to satisfy their legal
reserve requirements. 15 To offset the opportunity cost of maintaining these deposits, the
Federal Reserve granted “earnings credits” to the depositories at approximately the federal
funds rate, similar to the practice of private correspondent banks.’6 These credits could be
used to defray the costof Federal Reserve services but could not be withdrawn in cash nor
used to pay penalties.17
During the 1980s, the required clearing balance program came to more closely
15 Required clearing balance contracts are negotiated becausethe Monetary Control Actprohibits
the Federal Reserve from imposing payments-related reserve requirements.
15 Analogies between Federal Reserve deposits and the deposits of respondents at
correspondent banks also may account, in part, for the exclusion of required clearing balance
contracts from current measures of the monetary base and bank reserves. Antecedents extend
backto the initial three-year phase-in of the Federal Reserve Act. As national banks
“transferred” deposits to the newly-created Reserve Banks, some historical accounts suggest
that the Federal Reserve failed to fully recognize its role as the creator rather than the
recipient of these deposits, and its responsibility for (and ability to control) the total amount
of such deposits. See Friedman and Schwartz (1963), pp. 195-6 and Burgess (1936), chapter 3.
16Eamings credits accrue at the federal funds rate adjusted for (implicit) reserve requirements.
SeeStevens (1993).6
resemble a voluntary reserve management tool offered by the Federal Reserve to depository
institutions than an external, regulatory contraint. Soon after its introduction, and especially
after the introduction of contemporaneous reserve accounting in February 1984, some
depository institutions realized that maintaining a voluntary required clearing balance contract
could simplify the management of their Federal Reserve deposit account. The additional
Federal Reserve deposits held to satisfy the contract are available to make interbank payments
in exactly the same way as other Federal Reserve deposits. Furthemiore, the additional
deposits provide a bufferagainst unanticipated increases in reservable deposits or payments-
related debits. Federal Reserve accounting rules always first apply adepository’s Federal
Reserve deposits to satisfy the institution’s required reserves, and only thereafter does the Fed
apply the remaining deposits to satisfy the institution’s required clearing balance contract.
Although ashortfall of Federal Reserve deposits relative to required reserves is likely to
trigger significant penalities andincreased regulatory scrutiny, a small shortfall relative to the
amount of their clearing balance contract incurs no penalty. Larger shortfalls relativeto the
contracted amount are penalized at either a2 percent or 4 percent annual rate, often less costly
than borrowing in the federal funds market or at the discount window.
The clearing balance program expanded rapidly during the early 1980s, and then
slowed.’8 In March 1981, about 75 depositories had required clearing balance contracts; by
March 1985, about 4800 depositories had contracted to maintain about $1.3 billion in required
clearing balances. The numbers were about the same during the third quarter of 1990, with
4600 depositories contracted to maintain about $1.5 billion. Interestingly, about half of these
‘ Feinman (1993) and Hilton (1993) survey the growth of required clearing balance contracts
since 1980.7
institutions apparently held Federal Reserve deposits solely for payments activity, since they
fully satisfied their required reserves with vault cash. Both the number of institutions with
contracts and the aggregate amount of required clearing balance contracts increased sharply
following the December 1990 - January 1991 and April 1992 reductions in reserve
requirements.’9 During the third quarter of 1992, about 5000 institutions contracted to
maintain about $5.0 billion, triple the amount two years earlier. Moreover, about two-thirds of
these institutions fully satisfied their reserve requirements with vault cash, and hence likely
held Federal Reserve deposits primarily for payments purposes. This apparent substitution by
some depository institutions of voluntary clearing balance requirements for statutory reserve
requirements suggests that required clearing balance contracts should be included in the
monetary base.
Gilbert (1983, p. 23) provides a clear statement of the rationale that led in the early
l980s to the exclusion of required clearing balance contracts from the current measure of the
monetary base:
Depository institutions maintain clearing balances at Federal Reserve Banks as
a means of payment for the fees Federal Reserve Banks now charge for
services. Depository institutions receive implicit interest on their clearing
balances at the federal funds rate, which may be used to pay the fees on
services. Required clearing balances are subtracted in computing the
[monetary] source base because clearing balances are part of total reserve
balances held by depository institutions at Federal Reserve Banks, but are not
related to the levels of deposit liabilities.20
The 1990-91 reduction in reserve requirements was followed by a significant increase in
daylight overdrafts during a period when the Federal Reserve was increasing its scrutiny of
overdrafts; see Richards (1995), pp. 1069-70 and Figure 3, p. 1070. We do not know if concern
regarding the level ofdaylight overdrafts led to increases in FederalReserve deposits and required
clearing balance contracts, but the timing is suggestive.
17 Authors’ note: Contrary to the teiminology in the quotation, required clearing balances are
not included in Federal Reserve data on reserve balances.8
Gilbert’s argument would be persuasive if required clearing balances were a separate, distinct
type of deposit at Federal Reserve Banks, used solely used to defray the cost of Federal
Reserve payment-related services. Some depository institutions may indeed have treatedtheir
Federal Reserve deposits used to satisfy clearing balance contracts in this way during the early
1980s. For at least the last decade, however, required clearing balance contracts have been a
flexible, voluntary commitment to maintain alarger Federal Reserve deposit balance than
necessary to satisfy required reserves; they are neither a distinct type nor separate category of
deposit.2’
The inclusion of clearing balance contracts also is suggested by Balbach and Burger’s
(1976, p.3) conceptual basis foridentifying and measuring the monetary base:
“... (the monetary base) can therefore be identified in any monetary system by
ascertaining and summing the following:
1. those assets which the consolidated banking sector [depository institutions]
uses to settle interbank debt; and
2. those items, aside from bank [depository institution] liabilities, which are
used as money.”
The deposits at Federal Reserve Banks used to satisfy required clearing balance contracts fall
clearly within this definition becausethe deposits are used to settle interbank payments.
Indeed, for many depository institutions during the early 1980s, required clearing balance
contracts arose because the institutions actively used their Federal Reserve accounts to settle
interbank payments. Proper measurement of the monetary base requires the inclusion of
deposits at Federal Reserve Banks that are applied to satisfy required clearing balance
contracts, since these deposits are available forand used to settle interbank debts. The
~ There is one exception to this statement. Anonmember depository institution may have a
separate clearing balance deposit account at aFederal Reserve Bank if it satisfies its required
reserves via apassthrough contract with anothereligible depository institution.9
omission of required clearing balanceshas allowed the current measure of the monetary base
to drift further and further from its conceptual basis.
Table 1 provides a detailed comparison of the current and revised monetary base
measures. The factors that supply base money, lines 1 through 4 in the table, are unaffected
by the revision. The largest factor, Reserve Bank credit (line 1), varies directly with changes
in the quantity of securities held by the Federal Reserve (line la), the amount of Federal
Reserve lending to financial institutions (line ib), Federal Reserve float (line ic) and other
assets acquired by the Federal Reserve (line id). Because the longer-temi growth of Reserve
Bank credit is determined almost entirely by Federal Reserve actions and because Reserve
Bank credit supplies about 90 percent of base money, the Federal Reserve can closely control
the long run growth of the monetary base.
The current measure of the St. Louis monetary base (line 6) equals the sum of
currency in circulation outside the Treasury and Federal Reserve (line 6a) plus reserve
balances of depository institutions (line 6b). Uses of base money not included in the monetary
base are shown in line 7. The revised measure ofthe monetary base recognizes the similarity
of required clearing balance contracts (line 7d) to reserve balances (line 6b), and the
differencesbetween required clearing balance contracts and the other three excluded uses
(lines 7a, b, and c). First, required clearing balance contracts represent Federal Reserve
deposits of depository institutions, similar to reserve balances (line 6b); the other excluded
uses do not. Second, depository institutions may use the Federal Reserve deposits represented
by required clearing balance contracts to make or receive interbank payments in the same way
as reserve balances, and the deposits also may be converted into vault cash as necessary; the
other excluded items cannot. Finally, the three excluded uses other than required clearing
balance contracts are the actual dollar amounts of base money used (lines 7a, b, and c); for10
required clearing balances, only the contractual amount (line 7d) is excluded, not the amount
of Federal Reserve deposits used to satisfy the contracts.
The revised measure of the monetary base (line 8) includes all Federal Reserve
deposits of domestic depository institutions (line 8b); specifically, required clearing balance
contracts are not subtracted from depository institutions’ Federal Reserve deposits. The
inclusion of required clearing balance contracts increases the amount of Federal Reserve
deposits included in the monetary base (line 8b) by about one-fourth; equivalently, about one-
fifth of the Federal Reserve deposits held by depository institutions during December 1995
were not used to satisfy required reserves. The other uses of base money excluded from the
monetary base (lines 9a, b, and c) are unchanged by the revision.
The difference between the current and revised measures of the monetary base since
1980 is shown in Figure 1, and largely reflects changes in the aggregate amount of required
clearing balance contracts.
CURRENT AND NEW RESERVE ADJUSTMENT MAGNITUDES
Conditional on assumptions about which types of depository institutions respond to
changes in reserve requirements, the reserve adjustment magnitude (RAM) translates the
effects of changes in reserve requirements into equivalent changes in the monetary base.
Depository institutions hold base money forthree reasons: to satisfy statutory reserve
requirements, to convert retail deposits into currency on request, and to absorb debits and
credits due to interbank payments. The current RAM assumes that the quantity of base money
(vault cash and Federal Reserve deposits) depository institutions demand will change about
dollarfor dollar with changes in required reserves due to changes in statutory reserve
requirements. Although a reasonable assumption formember banks before 1980, since the
Monetary Control Act an increasing number of depository institutions have not responded to11
changes in reserve requirements in the way the current RAM assumes.
Two Classes of Depository Institutions
The new RAM presented in this article is a generalization of the RAM proposed by
Burger and Rasche (1977).22 In that RAM, depository institutions were separated into two
groups based on the likelihood that a depository would change its holdings of vault cash and
Federal Reserve deposits following a change in statutory reserve requirements. Member
banks, subject to relatively high statutory Federal Reserve reserve requirements, were
assumed to reduce their holdings of Federal Reserve deposits about dollar for dollar with a
change in required reserves due to achange in statutory requirements. Nonmemberbanks and
thrifts, not subject to Federal Reserve reserve requirements, were assumed not to respondto
changes in statutory reserve requirements. Only member banks were included in calculation
of RAM because only at member banks did changes in reserve requirements liberate or absorb
base money.
The new RAM is constructed from apanel data set consisting of individual depository
institution data submitted to the Federal Reserve weekly since 1980 by about 12,000
depository institutions. Absent a fully worked out model of depository institution reserve
management, we use statistical tests to separate depository institutions into two classes.23
Institutions in the first class are assumed to respondto changes in reserve requirements by
changing their holdings of Federal Reserve deposits approximately dollar for dollar with
22 Several previous variants of the Burger-Rasche reserve adjustment magnitude have been
included in the adjusted monetary base since 1980; see Gilbert (1980, 1987). The RAM used
from November 1980 through December 1981excluded both the deposits and required reserves
of nonmember institutions on the grounds that these institutions seemed likely to satisfy their
initial reserve requirements with vault cash, and hence their holdings of base money would not
be affected by changes in reserve requirements; see Gilbert (1980), p 4. The RAM adjustment
we present in this article is conceptually similar to that earlier RAM.
23 The tests, basically analysis-of-variance tests, are described in Anderson and Rasche (1996).12
changes in their required reserves, and hence are included in the calculation of RAM.
Institutions in the second class are assumed to have abusiness need for base money that
exceeds the amount of their required reserves. As a result, the quantity of base money held by
these institutions is assumednot to vary with changes in reserve requirements, but rather to be
determined primarily by their need to convert deposits into currency andto settle interbank
payments.24 These institutions are omitted from RAM.
For dates following implementation of the Monetary Control Act in November 1980,
our analysis suggests that three groups of depository institutions belong in the second class,
thereby excluding them from the calculation of RAM:
• Institutions that fully satisfied their required reserves with vault cash (or, in other words,
were legally nonbound), beginning with the reserve maintenance period ending November
19, 1980. Our analysis suggests that these institutions tended not to adjust their holdings of
base money, relative to net transactions deposits, following a change in reserve
requirements. If these institutions’ vault cash is determined primarily by their need to
convert customer deposits into currency, it seems reasonable that their holdings of base
money, including Federal Reserve deposits, will be insensitive to changes in reserve
requirements. Since 1985 more than half of the depositories with required clearing
balance contracts have been legally nonbound, satisfying their required reserves with vault
cash.
• Institutions that were subject to a maximum 3 percent marginal reserve requirement on net
transaction deposits and did not satisfy their required reserves with vault cash (or in other
words were legally bound), beginning with the reserve maintenance period ending January
7, 1991. These small bound institutions are included in the first class (and hence in RAM)
prior to January 1991.25
24 Some studies of firms’ money demand have noted an analogous result, in a different context:
loan-based compensating balance requirements were not binding on firms during the 1970s when
the firms’ transactions need for demand deposits exceeded the amount of demand deposits
required by the compensating balance requirement. See Enzler, Johnson and Paulus (1976), p.
274.
25 Evidence for the inclusion of small bound institutions prior to January 1991 is weaker than for
the inclusion of other groups of institutions. Some tests suggest that these institutions, as a
group, might be excluded from RAM beginning in 1980, as are smallnonbound institutions. As
aresult, we are continuing to study andmodel the reserve management behavior of smallerbanks.13
• Institutions with net transactions deposits of less than about $135 million, beginning with
the reserve maintenance period ending January 7, 1991.26
Examination of the responses of these institutions to the December 1990 - January 1991 and
April 1992 reductions in reserve requirements suggests that their base money holdings were
likely determined by the business needs of the institutions, rather than statutory reserve
requirements, after January 1991.
Calculating RAM
The new RAM adjustment is calculated as follows. For each week (through January
1984) or reserve maintenance period (beginning February 1984), a reserve adjustment
magnitude is calculated for each institution included in RAM by subtracting the institution’s
actual required reserves during that period from an estimate of what the institution’s required
reserves would have been if the reserve requirements that prevailed during the reserve
maintenance period endingJanuary 7, 1991, had been in effect. This approach is the Burger-
Rasche (1977) adjustment applied to individual institutions, using the reserve requirements in
effect during the January 7, 1991 reserve maintenance period as the base period for calculation
of RAM. This base period is convenient because reserve requirements on nontransactions
deposits and Eurodollar liabilities at weekly reporting institutions were reducedto zero on that
date.27 The aggregate RAM for each reserve maintenance period equals the sum of the
26 The value for 1991 is $135 million. The value increases annually by the percentage increase
in the aggregate net transactions deposits of all depository institutions. Although thisprocedure
is supported by preliminary tests, we are continuing to study and model the reserve management
behavior of these medium-size banks.
27 Choice of an earlier base period would have required recomputing required reserves on
nontransactions as well as transactionsdeposits, particularly difficultduring the Monetary Control
Act1980-84 phase-inperiod for memberbanks. Mergers andacquisitions also must be accounted
forin computing RAM. The the required reserves of a combined institution are reducedduring14
individual reserve adjustment magnitudes across all depository institutions.
The current and new RAM are shown in Figure 2, both series normalized to equal
zero in December 1980.28 The two series begin to diverge in 1983, and major differences
appear following reductions in reserve requirements in December 1990 - January 1991 and in
April 1992. On the first of these dates, reserve requirements on nonpersonal time deposits and
Eurodollar borrowings were reduced from 3 percent to zero; on the second, the marginal
reserve requirement on net transactions deposits over about $42 million was reduced from 12
to 10 percent. Board of Govemors’ staff estimate that these actions reduced aggregate
required reserves by about $13.2 and $8.9 billion, respectively. Largely reflecting the change
in required reserves, the current RAM increases by about $13.1 and $9.1 billion during the
same periods, respectively. The new RAM, which omits depository institutions estimated to
have not responded to the reductions, increases by about $12.3 and $7.3 billion, respectively.29
From January 1936 - October 1980, the revised measure of the St. Louis adjusted
monetary base presented in this article is based on the adjusted monetary base developed by
Tatom (1980), Table 1. Tatom (1980) measured RAM in segments, renormalizing RAM when
the eight quarters following an acquisition by a phase-outofthe acquiredinstitution’s low reserve
tranche. In our calculations, we have assumed that an institution eligible for such a tranche loss
adjustment in amaintenance period remains eligible when the reserve requirements from January
7, 1991 are applied to that period, except that the size of the tranche loss adjustment is increased
or decreased by the percentage change in the tranche between that period and the base period.
We also omit depository institutions granted the Federal Reserve’s “bankers’ bank” exemption
from reserve requirements.
28 Actual values of the current and revised RAM series are about -$2.2 and -$18.5 billion,
respectively, in December 1980.
29 Some of our statistical tests suggest that small bound banks should be excluded from RAM
before the January 7, 1991 maintenance period. ARAM that excludes these institutions increases
by $9.9, rather than $12.3, billion between December 1990 and January 1991. Overall, this
alternative RAM closely resembles the one shown in Figure 2. The series is available from the
authors on request.15
the structure of reserve requirements changed significantly. Tatom constructed separate RAM
adjustments for 1935 - 1972, 1972-74 and 1975 - October 1980, chaining these together to
form an adjusted monetary base index. The new adjusted monetary base presented in this
article is chained to Tatom’s series in October 1980 using his methodology, and hence has the
same growth rate as Tatom’s data from January 1935 - October 1980.~°
OLD AND NEW ADJUSTED TOTAL RESERVES: DIFFERENCES
The new monetary base and RAM presented in this article change only the adjusted
reserves component of the adjusted monetary base (currency in circulation is unchanged). The
current andnew adjusted reserves series are shown in Figure 3. Since the difference between
the levels of the series is largely determined by the choice of a base period for RAM, it is
differences in the growth rates (not the levels) of the alternative series that matter. Year-over-
year growth rates are shown in Figure 4, and the differences between the growth rates are
shown in Figure 5. The growth of the new adjusted reserves series accelerates more rapidly
than the current series during periods of ease in monetary policy such as 1985-1987 and 1992-
1993, and slows more rapidly during tightening policy, including 1983-1984, 1990-1991 and
1994-1995. Overall, the new series suggests greater swings in the stance of monetary policy,
measured by the growth rate of adjusted reserves, than does the old.
SUMMARY
We have introduced a new measure of the adjusted reserves component of the St.
Louis adjusted monetary base. The new measure reflects the significant changes in financial
markets and institutions that have occurred since implementation of the Monetary Control Act
30 A more detailed description of the chained series is available from the authors on request.16
in 1980.
The definition of the monetary base is revised by including the contractual amount of
required clearing balances at Federal Reserve Banks. Required clearing balances are not a
separate type of Federal Reserve deposit, but rather are a contractual commitment by a
depository institution to maintain more Federal Reserve deposits than are necessary to satisfy
the institution’s statutory reserve requirements. The deposits used to satisfy the contract are
available for interbank payments and other business activity of the depository institution, in
the same way as deposits used to satisfy statuatory reserve requirements. As such, Federal
Reserve deposits held to meet contractual required clearing balance contracts belong in the
reserves component of the monetary base.
The new RAM is ageneralization of the RAM proposed by Burger and Rasche
(1977). The adjustment recognizes that some depository institutions will not respond fully, in
terms of changing the quantity of base money demanded, to reductions in required reserve
ratios as is assumed in the calculation of the current RAM. Absent afully specified model of
depository instutitions’ demand for the monetary base, the new RAM employs statistical tests
to separate depositories into two classes. Institutions in one class find reserve requirements
the binding constraint on their holdings of base money, and are assumed to reduce their
demand for base money about dollar-for-dollar with any reduction in required reserves.
Institutions in the other class find their demand for base money driven primarily determined
by the business needs of the depository, including making interbank payments. As a working
hypothesis, the quantity of base money held by institutions in the latter class is assumed to be
insensitive to changes in reserve requirements. In contrast, the current RAM assumes that all
depositories essentially reduce their holdings of base money dollar for dollar with reductions17
in required reserves.
Since the Monetary Control Act, many depository institutions have found their demand
for base money driven more by their retail deposit and interbank payments activity than by
legal reserve requirements. Ignoringthis change, previous measurements of RAM have
overstated the amount of base money absorbed or liberated by changes in reserve
requirements.
The new adjusted reserves data presented in this article suggest that the stance of
monetary policy, measured by the growth rate of adjusted reserves, has been more volatile
since 1980 then suggested by the current measure. Additional research will be required to
refine the calculation of RAM and to determine the importance of the revised data in
econometric studies, as well as the appropriate role of the revised adjusted monetary base in
monetary policy decision making.18
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Current and Revised Measures of the Monetary Base, December 1995
Factors Sugolving Base Money Factors Using Base Money: Current Measure of the Monetary Base
(1) Reserve Bank credit
(a) Securities held by the Federal Reserve
(b) Loans to depository institutions
(c) Federal Reserve float
(d) Other Federal Reserve assets ______
Total Reserve Bank credit
(2) Gold stock 11.050
(3) SDR certificates 10.168
(4) US Treasury currency and coin outstanding 23.958
Total supply of base money other than Reserve Bank credit 45.177
(5) Total supply of base money 465.952
(6) The Monetary Base: Current Measure
(a) Currency and coin in circulation
(b) Reserve balances of depository institutions
at Federal Reserve Banks
Total monetary base
(7) Uses of base money other than as the monetary base
(a) Treasury cash holdings
(b) Deposits of other than domestic financial institutions
at Federal Reserve Banks
(c) Other Federal Reserve liabilities and capital
(d) Deposits, other than reserve balances, of domestic
financial institutions at Federal Reserve Banks, including
contractual amount of required clearing balances
(8) The Monetary Base: Revised Measure
(a) Currency and coin in circulation
(b) Deposits of financial institutions at Federal
Reserve Banks (revised measure)
Total monetary base
(9) Uses other than as the monetary base
(a) Treasury cash
(b) Deposits of otherthan domestic financial
institutions at Federal Reserve Banks
(c) Other Federal Reserve liabilities and capital
Total otherfactors using base money (revised measure)
billions of dollars, not seasonally adjusted
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A Revised Measure of the St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base
Richard G. Anderson and Robert H. Rasche
The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ adjusted monetary base combines in a single index
Federal Reserve actions that affect the supply of base money -- open market operations,
discount window lending and unsterilized foreign exchange market intervention -- with actions
that affect depository institutions’ demand forbase money -- changes in statutory reserve
requirements. The adjusted monetary base euquals the sum ofthe monetary base and a
reserve adjustment magnitude (RAM) that maps changes in reserve requirements into
equivalent changes in the (unadjusted) monetary base. This paper presents a revised measure
of the adjusted total reserves component of the monetary base and a new RAM. The revised
measure of the adjusted reserves component differs from the current measure by including the
aggregate amount of depository institutions’ required clearing balance contracts with the
Federal Reserve. The new RAM differs from the current RAM by recognizing that, since the
Monetary Control Act of 1980, an increasing number of depository institutions have not
significantly changed their demand for base money (vault cash and Federal Reserve deposits)
relative to transactions deposits following changes in statutory reserve requirements. The new
adjusted reserves data suggest that the stance of monetary policy, measured by the growth rate
of adjusted reserves, has been more volatile since 1980 then suggested by the current
measure.